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lNr.BRNATIONAL LAw-THB ABROGATION op TRBATIBs BY WAR-In 1923, 
the United States and Germany entered into a treaty, one provision of which 
exempted from taxation the government property of either nation situated in 
the territory of the other. From the outbreak of W~rld War II in 1941 through 
1948 the City and County of San Francisco levied real property taxes on the 
German Consulate, assuming that this treaty had been abrogated by the out-
break of hostilities between the two nations. The taxes were paid under protest, 
and the Attorney General, as successor to the Alien Property Custodian, sued 
and recovered them in the trial court. On appeal, held, affirmed. The views of 
the State Department and the mutuality of the benefits accruing to the signa-
tories require the finding that the treaty provision was not affected by the war. 
Brownell v. City and County of San Francisco, (Cal. App. 1954) 271 P. (2d) 
597. 
Since the early nineteenth century there has been a marked change in 
judicial opinion concerning the effect of war in abrogating treaties. Early 
writers took the position that war automatically terminates all agreements be-
tween the hostile parties.1 This view was rejected by the United States Supreme 
Court as early as 1823, however, in a case which held that insofar as alien 
inheritance rights were concerned, the Jay Treaty was not abrogated by the 
War of 1812.2 The Court decided that not all treaties are annulled by war, but 
only those so intended by the contracting parties.8 After this decision, the 
question lay dormant for almost a century, and later cases which discuss it 
evidence no uniformity.4 In 1920, however, the problem was channelled into 
a new course by the New York Court of Appeals in Techt 11. Hughes.5 This 
case involved the right of an alien to inherit property under an Austrian treaty 
13 PmLLIMoRl!, INTERNATIONAL LAW 792 et seq. (1885), and the authorities there 
cited. Phillimore admits that there are exceptions, however, e.g., when the treaty provides 
for the outbreak of hostilities. That this rule was never the law is asserted in 1 CoL. L. 
REv. 210 (1901). France adheres to this position at the present time. Rank, "l\tlodem 
War and the Validity of Treaties," 38 CoRN. L.Q. 321 (1953). See also 51 MICH. L. 
REv. 566 (1953). 
2 Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Town of New Haven, 8 Wheat. (21 
U.S.) 464 (1823). The same position was taken by the English High Court of Chancei:y in 
Sutton v. Sutton, 1 Russ. & M. 663, 39 Eng. Rep. 255 (1830). 
a Where no intent was expressed, it is often implied from the type of treaty involved; 
for example, treaties of alliance are presumed to be terminated automatically. 
4Hutchinson v. Brock, 11 Mass. 119 (1814), follows the view of Phillimore. Fox v. 
Southack, 12 Mass. 146 (1815), more closely adheres to the decision in the Gospel case, 
note 2 supra, although not specifically placing its dictum on grounds of intent. 0£ course, 
rights vested under a treaty are not divested by its termination. Fiott v. Co=onwealth, 
53 Va. 564 (1855); McNair v. Ragland, 16 N.C. 516 (1830). 
r; 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185 (1920). 
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claimed to have been rendered nugatory by World War I. The opinion partially 
abandoned the "intent" rule, and based its finding instead on a determination 
of "national policy" as indicated by the legislative and executive branches of the 
government. As stated by Justice Cardozo, ''The question is not what states 
may do after war has supervened. . . . The question is what courts are to pre-
sume that they have done."6 In the absence of an indication of what the United 
States had done, the court presumed that the treaty was still in force. As seen 
from subsequent cases, the result of this case has served not only to increase 
the likelihood of upholding treaties, but also to shift reliance in determining their 
validity to congressional and executive expressions of policy.7 The old theory 
of determining the intent of the signatories is not wholly abandoned, however. 
Present national policy controls only when the words of the agreement or sur-
rounding sources reveal neither an intent to abrogate nor to perpetuate the 
treaty in time of war.8 When national policy is the determinant, various sources 
have been utilized by the courts to ascertain it.9 It is in this area that the prin-
cipal case extends Techt v. Hughes and the cases following it, by changing the 
criterion of continued validity from the courts' belief as to what the state has 
done with the treaty, to the courts' acceptance of the state's present attitude 
toward the treaty. While some cases had noted prior communications from 
government sources, the decision here under discussion relies heavily on self-
serving statements from officials of the State Department which concern the 
controversy itself.16 It is much like the procedure involved when the State 
o Id. at 242-243. 
7 Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503, 67 S.Ct. 1431 (1947); The Sophie Rickmers, (D.C. 
N.Y. 1930) 45 F. (2d) 413, commented upon in 29 MicH. L. REv. 947 (1931); State ex 
rel. Miner v. Reardon, 120 Kan. 614, 245 P. 158 (1926); Estate of Knutzen, 31 Cal. (2d) 
573, 191 P. (2d) 747 (1948); Meier v. Schmidt, 150 Neb. 383, 34 N.W. (2d) 400 
(1948); Estate of Meyers, 107 Cal. App. (2d) 799, 238 P. (2d) 597 (1951). Some 
decisions have indicated more of a tendency to abrogate treaties than might be warranted 
from the rule of Techt v. Hughes. In Kamuth v. United States, 279 U.S. 231 at 239, 49 
S.Ct. 274 (1929), for example, the Supreme Court found that a right to pass freely across 
the Canadian border was annulled by the War of 1812. The Court determined that the 
treaty was incompatible with a state of war, without reference to present policy expressions 
of the government. Cases similarly oriented are Ex parte Zenzo Arakawa, (D.C. Pa. 1947) 
79 F. Supp. 468, and McCandless v. United States ex rel. Diabo, (3d Cir. 1928) 25 F. 
(2d) 71. 
8 Clark v. Allen, note 7 supra. The court in this case admits that there may be an 
area for judicial determination of national policy solely by inspection of the treaty without 
reference to present statements of the political branches of the government, and cites 
Kamuth v. United States, note 7 supra, as authority. 
9 Besides acts of Congress, which themselves may displace an earlier treaty, other 
sources were employed in the following cases: Clark v. Allen, note 7 supra (executive 
orders, other contemporary treaties, and a communication of the Secretary of State involving 
the litigation before the court); Flensburger Dampfercompagnie v. United States, (Ct. Cl. 
1932) 59 F. (2d) 464, cert. den. 286 U.S. 564, 52 S.Ct. 645 (1932) (negotiations for 
the Treaty of Versailles relied on to infer the continued validity of a treaty); The Sophie 
Rickmers, note 7 supra (commercial practice, reciprocal treaty stipulations and letters of the 
State Department). 
10 Brownell v. City and County of San Francisco, (Cal. App. 1954) 271 P. (2d) 974 
at 977-978. Clark v. Allen, note 7 supra, also referred to a letter of the Secretary of State 
concerning its position in the case, but the court seemingly placed little reliance on it. In 
another case not concerned with the effect of war on treaties it has been said that on 
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Depar1ment by certification immunizes property in which a foreign government 
has sufficient interest, and thus precludes litigants from establishing claims 
ag~st it.11 This procedure is binding on the courts.12 There are two reasons 
why the court in the principal case was on particularly strong ground in uphold-
ing the validity of the treaty provision. First, unlike most of the cases cited, this 
dispute is not concerned with the rights of nationals of the contracting parties, 
but rather with rights of the parties themselves. In such a sensitive situation, 
the views of the State Department should be controlling.18 Furthermore, a 
question exists whether property used by foreign governments might be tax 
exempt even in the absence of a treaty.14 Despite the peculiar circumstances of 
the case, however, there is a positive indication that war, in and of itself, has 
become of decreasing importance as an abrogator of treaties.15 The acts and 
intent of the governmental departments which decide national policy, rather 
than judicial decisions based on vague and elusive touchstones, determine now 
more than ever whether a treaty survives the outbreak of war. Considering the 
essentially political nature of the question involved, the opinion can hardly be 
criticized. 
David R. Macdonald, S.Ed. 
questions of the termination of treaties, the decisions of the chiefs of state are conclusive 
or at least weigh very heavily. Ivancevic v. Artukovic, (9th Cir. 1954) 211 F. (2d) 565. 
11 The process is explained in [1947] BmnsH YEAmlOOK OP !NJ:EBNATIONAL I.Aw 
116 and criticized in Cardozo, "Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in 
Court," 67 HARv. L. R.Bv. 608 (1954). 
12 Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 63 S.Ct. 793 (1943). 
18 Of course, it could also be argued if the theory of the Karnuth case were accepted, 
that upon looking at the treaty alone, a tax exemption of foreign government property is 
less compati'hle with a state of war than are treaties involving only the rights of nationals. 
14 See Bishop, "Immunity from Taxation of Foreign State-Owned Property,'' 46 AM. 
J. INT. L. 239 (1952). 
15 One writer thinks that war is no more than an example of the "changed circum• 
stances" doctrine in its effect on treaties. Rank, "Modern War and the Validity of Treaties," 
38 CORN, L.Q. 321, 511 (1953). 
